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Russian	concessions	to	Europe	are	unlikely,	and
European	concessions	to	Russia	are	useless
Is	there	any	prospect	of	an	end	to	the	deterioration	of	relations	between	the	EU	and	Russia?	Irina
Busygina	explains	that	Vladimir	Putin’s	strategy	for	maintaining	domestic	support	has	focused	on	the
construction	of	external	threats	and	the	promotion	of	an	image	of	‘Russian	greatness’	on	the
international	stage.	But	by	putting	foreign	policy	in	the	service	of	domestic	goals,	Putin	has	created	a
situation	where	he	can’t	make	any	concessions	to	Europe,	and	where	European	concessions	to	Russia
are	useless.
Credit:	kremlin.ru
In	a	previous	article	on	this	site	in	2016,	I	wrote	that	that	both	the	European	Union	and	Russia	had	few	incentives	to
normalise	their	relations.	Since	then,	the	political	relationship	has	deteriorated	significantly.	Europe	is	learning	how	to
talk	to	Russia	on	the	“language	of	coercion”.	The	recent	manifestations	of	this	include	expelling	Russian	diplomats
from	Europe	in	response	to	the	Salisbury	attack	(and	Russia’s	“mirror	measures”).	There	is	also	a	new	level	of
financial	scrutiny	against	“suspiciously	wealthy”	Russians	in	London,	and	accusations	against	Russia	of	blocking	the
access	of	experts	from	the	Organization	for	the	Prohibition	of	Chemical	Weapons	to	the	site	of	the	alleged	chemical
attack	in	the	Syrian	city	of	Douma.
It	can	be	argued	that	there	are	now	no	incentives	for	improving	the	relationship,	but	strong	incentives	for	further
deterioration,	at	least	from	the	Russian	side.	As	Russian	Foreign	Minister	Sergei	Lavrov	said	in	an	interview	with	the
BBC,	relations	between	Russia	and	the	West	are	worse	now	than	in	the	days	of	the	Cold	War,	because	in	those	days
there	were	channels	of	communication	and	there	was	no	obsession	with	Russophobia,	which	looks	like	genocide
through	sanctions.	With	the	first	part	of	this	phrase	one	can	fully	agree.	Some	call	this	situation	a	“new	normal”,
however,	“normality”,	whether	old	or	new,	still	applies	to	a	stable	situation,	to	the	status	quo,	that	is	definitively	not
the	case	at	the	moment.	Where	the	“bottom	point”	of	the	EU-Russia	relationship	lies,	is	not	yet	clear.
Meanwhile,	it	is	important	not	to	confuse	the	various	manifestations	of	the	deterioration	of	EU-Russia	relations	with
the	main	reason	for	the	deterioration.	I	argue	that	this	deep	reason	is	not	that	the	“world	of	democracies”	meets	an
increasingly	consolidated	autocracy:	as	previous	practice	shows,	democracies	and	autocracies	are	capable	of
peaceful	interaction.	The	reason	lies	in	the	specific	relations	that	bind	Russian	foreign	and	domestic	policy,	and	this
fundamentally	differentiates	the	situation	in	Russia	and	Europe.
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In	the	EU	and	European	countries,	members	and	non-members	of	the	Union,	foreign	policy	is	an	autonomous	policy
sphere,	although	strategically	connected	with	domestic	policy.	Of	course,	foreign	policy	moves	can	be	successful	and
less	successful,	and	the	meaning	and	timeliness	of	these	moves	can	raise	questions.	For	instance,	a	reasonable
question	in	relation	to	the	crackdown	that	British	Prime	Minister	Theresa	May	has	vowed	on	“serious	criminals	and
corrupt	elites”	from	Russia	who	have	settled	in	London	might	be:	why	was	it	only	announced	now?	The	situation	was
widely	known	about	for	a	long	time	and	repeatedly	discussed	in	mass	media,	both	Western	and	Russian,	but	until
recently	this	didn’t	cause	a	reaction	(at	least,	embodied	in	the	actions)	in	British	state	institutions.	With	regard	to	the
EU’s	foreign	policy,	the	difficulties	of	reaching	a	common	position	are	obvious.	For	many	years,	Russia	has	been	a
“dividing	issue”	inside	the	EU:	not	all	member-states	agree	with	Brussels’	current	level	of	disengagement	with
Moscow,	and	–	at	least	in	part	–	this	is	due	to	different	levels	of	dependency	on	Russia	for	some	member	states	in
contrast	to	others.
However,	what	is	important	is	that	the	foreign	policy	of	the	EU	and	European	countries	remains	“foreign”:	it	is	facing
the	outside	world	and	is	motivated	by	external	challenges	and	goals.	The	situation	in	Russia	is	fundamentally
different.	Under	the	conditions	in	Russia,	where	there	has	been	no	succession	of	power	and	the	incumbent	has
remained	in	the	presidential	office	for	eighteen	years,	domestic	popular	support	is	the	most	important	and
indispensable	pillar	of	Putin’s	rule,	and	this	–	with	the	obligatory	condition	of	the	primacy	of	the	Russian	state	–	has
to	be	preserved	at	all	costs.	That	is	why	the	presidential	elections	of	18	March	in	Russia	were	a	culmination	of
unprecedented	struggle,	even	beyond	the	bounds	of	decency,	not	for	Putin’s	victory	(the	victory	itself	and	Putin’s
huge	break	from	the	other	candidates	were	obvious),	but	for	the	election	turnout	as	evidence	of	Putin’s	high
legitimacy.	And	Putin	confidently	won	the	elections	with	76%	of	the	vote	and	a	turnout	of	67%.
To	maintain	this	popular	support,	foreign	policy	has	arguably	become	the	most	powerful	of	all	domestic	policy	tools
for	Putin.	It	is	a	complex	tool,	consisting	of	various	elements	that	need	to	work	in	combination	–	which	in	turn	means
that	the	failure	of	just	one	element	can	ruin	the	system	as	a	whole.	Among	these	elements	are	Russia’s	military
actions,	both	near	its	borders	and	far	away	from	them;	the	‘philosophical’	interpretation	of	global	trends	and	Russia’s
role	in	the	world;	and	massive	propaganda	concerning	Russia’s	external	successes,	intended	for	a	domestic
audience.	And	to	consolidate	this	support,	the	idea	of	a	threat	to	Russia	from	the	West	is	being	designed	and	widely
propagated.
In	addition,	another	strategy	for	consolidating	support	has	been	to	revive	the	idea	of	Russia’s	greatness:	an	idea	that
is	“worthy	of	the	country’s	great	past”	(a	less	ambitious	project	Putin	can’t	offer,	as	the	Russian	audience,	excited	by
propaganda	for	several	years	now,	“will	not	buy”	the	project	of	a	“normal,	ordinary	country	of	Russia”).	Finally,	Putin’s
project	contains	a	considerable	sovereignist	component,	meaning	the	appeal	to	the	international	system	where	the
states	(great	powers,	but	not	smaller	states)	guided	by	“national	interests”	maintain	sovereign	control	over	their
institutions,	and	the	terms	of	its	international	interactions.	In	this	picture,	global	market	forces	are	perceived	as
“unfair”	and	therefore,	should	be	reduced	or	opposed.
All	in	all,	Putin’s	tools	for	maintaining	the	highest	level	of	domestic	support	possible	are	the	construction	of	external
threats	and	the	promotion	of	the	idea	of	Russia’s	greatness	with	an	essential	sovereignist	component.	All	this	should
unite	the	people	of	Russia	on	a	patriotic	basis.	The	flipside	of	manufacturing	a	virtual	external	threat	is	the
emergence	of	a	real	threat	of	political	and	economic	isolation	for	the	country	as	the	price	of	national	consolidation
and	preserving	popular	support	–	this	price,	however,	is	obviously	not	too	high	for	Putin,	at	least	for	now.	On	1
March,	in	a	message	to	the	Federal	Assembly,	he	revealed	his	plans	for	the	next	six	years	–	chiefly	the	restoration	of
Russia	as	a	military	superpower.	The	deputies	gave	him	a	standing	ovation,	and	two	weeks	later	the	people	did	the
same	thing,	enthusiastically	supporting	him	and	his	“great	ideas”.
What	follows	from	this	logic	is	that	the	Russian	leadership	does	not	aim	to	start	an	open	conflict:	Moscow’s	threats
are	more	a	by-product	of	its	strategy	for	achieving	domestic	mobilisation	and	the	preservation	of	popular	loyalty	to
the	regime	(though	fatal	mistakes	that	could	lead	to	an	open	conflict	are	not	excluded).	However,	this	logic	implies
two	more	conclusions.	By	putting	foreign	policy	in	the	service	of	domestic	goals,	Putin	has	created	a	situation	where
he	can’t	make	any	concessions	to	Europe	(even	in	the	unlikely	case	that	he	would	want	to	do	that).	From	the	other
side,	this	situation	makes	European	concessions	to	Putin	useless.	Europe	is	talking	to	Putin,	albeit	in	the	language	of
coercion.	Answering	her,	Putin	talks	with	his	folks.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
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Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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